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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, d/b/a LDS 
HOSPITAL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
and MARY JEAN ORTEGA, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 14690 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff appeals from a temporary order in favor of 
the defendant Ortega and against plaintiff, which order 
granted defendant Ortega temporary total disability and 
medical payments. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The claim of defendant Ortega against plaintiff was 
heard by the defendant Commission, after which the defendant 
Ortega appeared before a medical panel which subsequently 
issued a medical panel report. Based on the report, the 
defendant Industrial Commission issued a temporary order, 
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subsequently amended, which awarded temporary total 
disability payments and medical payments to defendant • 
Ortega pending a final determination on the issue of 
permanent partial disability, 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT 
Plaintiff seeks to have an apportionment made of the 
medical expenses awarded, seeks to have the temporary total g 
disability payments eliminated, and seeks to have a dollar 
limit set on the medical benefits awarded. 
I 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant Or tega was an employee of p l a i n t i f f ' s 
h o s p i t a l i n November, 1970. While so employed and w h i l e 
f 
l i f t i n g laundry b a g s , she f e l t t h e o n s e t of b u r n i n g p a i n 
i n t h e l e f t i n t e r - s c a p u l a r a r e a . She was t o l d t h a t she had 
p u l l e d a musc le , was g iven a p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r p a i n , and 
s e n t back t o work. She was unable t o con t inue h e r work and 
a f t e r f u r t h e r c o n s u l t a t i o n i n t h e emergency room a t t h e 
h o s p i t a l was s e n t home. She was h o s p i t a l i z e d on January 14, 
19 71 w i t h a d i s c h a r g e d i a g n o s i s of c e r v i c a l s t r a i n , fol lowed 
by a second h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n on November 8, 19 73 w i th a d i s -
charge d i a g n o s i s of s e v e r e d o r s a l and lumbar s p i n e pa in and 
a n x i e t y . Both t imes she was t r e a t e d c o n s e r v a t i v e l y and no 
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neurologica l abnormali t ies were found. She has a h i s to ry 
of family problems, including a recent ly divorced son l i v ing 
a t home who i s now facing a second degree murder charge on 
an automobile acc iden t , and a husband who i s an a l coho l i c . 
In add i t ion , she i s having f inanc ia l problems and has a 15 
year old son who has hea l th problems and misses school . The 
medical panel repor ted t ha t of the 30 percent d i s a b i l i t y due 
to psychological problems, only 20 percent can be a t t r i b u t e d 
t o the i n d u s t r i a l acc ident . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
U.C.A. § 35-1-69 REQUIRES THAT THE AWARD TO CLAIiMANT 
BE APPORTIONED BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND THE SPECIAL FUND. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 i s c l e a r l y a p p l i c a b l e i n a 
case such as i s p r e s e n t e d h e r e fo r r ev iew. This Cour t i n a 
r e c e n t case which reviewed t h a t s e c t i o n of t h e law n o t e d t h a t 
among o t h e r p u r p o s e s , t he law encouraged employers t o h i r e 
handicapped workers who had p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g d i s a b i l i t i e s 
and e s t a b l i s h e d a "b roader base of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r p r e e x i s t -
i n g c o n d i t i o n s . " McPhie v . Uni ted S t a t e s S t e e l C o r p . , 551 P .2d 
504 CUtah 1976) . Those two purposes would be s p e c i f i c a l l y 
f r u s t r a t e d i f t h e temporary o r d e r of t h e defendant Commission 
i n t h i s case were a l lowed t o s t a n d . 
- 3 -
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The medical panelfs report in this case specifically 
found as follows: 
1. 30 percent permanent, partial disability because 
of the psychological aspects of the claimant's injury 
and 5 percent permanent, partial disability due to 
scoliosis and muscle strain, making the total 35 
percent permanent, partial disability; 
2. 20 percent permanent disability due to the indus-
trial injury on November 11, 1970, all of which was 
due to the psychological aspect; and 
3. 15 percent permanent physical impairment attribu-
table to a preexisting permanent, partial disability. 
Since there was preexisting permanent physical impair-
ment, the defendant Industrial Commission, according to the 
statute, should have assessed plaintiff measured by "the 
percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to 
the industrial injury only, and the remainder shall be payable 
out of the Special Fund." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69. To the 
contrary, the defendant Industrial Commission by its order has 
directed the plaintiff to pay all costs for medical treatment 
of defendant Ortega without any apportionment. 
The defendant Industrial Commission cited as the basis 
upon which it refused to make an apportionment the case of 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 422 P.2d 
740 (1967). in fact, that case is not applicable here since 
there is no argument on behalf of defendant Ortega or the 
plaintiff that the industrial accident complained of aggravated 
or lightened up a preexisting disease. Moreover, that case 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stands only for the p r i n c i p l e t h a t the employer must pay 
for such aggravation or l i g h t i n g up. I t does not reach 
the subjec t of apportionment a t a l l . Nothing in t h a t case 
ind ica t e s t h a t in a case of aggravation or l i g h t i n g up, the 
employer must pay for the p r e e x i s t i n g condit ion as we l l . To 
make such a claim would fly d i r e c t l y in the face of the apport-
ionment s t a t u t e . 
There are a number of cases decided by t h i s Court on 
apportionment between the employer and the spec ia l fund, but 
in none of those cases where t h i s Court found tha t the employer 
must pay the f u l l cos t , was there any finding by the medical 
panel of p r e e x i s t i n g condi t ions . See, e . g . , Ha fe r ' s , Inc . v. 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 526 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1974); Halvorson, 
Inc . v. Will iams, 19 Utah 2d 113, 426 P.2d 1019 (1967). Moreover 
the defendant Commission f a i l ed to have a determination made 
by the medical panel whether the 20 percent a t t r i b u t a b l e to 
the i n d u s t r i a l accident by the medical panel was s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
g rea t e r than i t would have been had the re been no previous 
e x i s t i n g condit ion of permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y . Cf. 
McPhie v. United S ta tes S tee l Corp. , 551 P.2d 504, 506 (Utah 
1976) (concurring opinion of E l l e t t , J . ) . 
In the i n s t a n t case the bulk i f not a l l of the p reex i s t i ng 
d i s a b i l i t y was due to the psychological problems defendant Ortega 
was suf fe r ing . The claimed-accident in quest ion came as a r e s u l t 
of the claimant l i f t i n g laundry bags and fee l ing a burning pa ia 
in the l e f t i n t e r - s c a p u l a r a rea , which she was to ld was a pu l led 
muscle. I t i s f a i r l y obvious, although the medical panel i s Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
s i l en t on the question, that since the panel found 20 percent 
permanent pa r t i a l d i sabi l i ty based solely on psychological 
impairment stemming from the indus t r ia l accident in question, 
then that impairment was substantial ly greater than i t would 
have been normally had there not been the preexist ing psycholo-
gical d i sab i l i ty . 
I t should be noted tha t the award which has been 
entered i s only a temporary award, but nonetheless making the 
p la in t i f f responsible for a l l medical treatment of the claimant's 
psychological problems. The claimant i s presently on an out-
pat ient basis with a psychia t r i s t with no indication when that 
treatment might be terminated. I t i s , therefore, patently 
unfair to charge the p la in t i f f with the ful l cost of that 
rather expensive treatment, par t icular ly without the benefit 
of a final determination by the defendant Commission as to the 
percentage of permanent d isabi l i ty a t t r ibutable to the p la in t i f f . 
I t i s the position of the p la in t i f f t h a t , a t the most, i t should 
only have to pay i t s apportioned share of the medical cost. 
The Special Fund, or , i f necessary, defendant Ortega herself, 
should pay the remaining portion. Further, upon a f inal deter-
mination of the amount of permanent p a r t i a l d isabi l i ty a t t r ibu-
table to the indus t r ia l accident in question, and also a t t r ibu-
table to preexisting conditions, i f the ra t io a t t r ibutable to 
the p la in t i f f should be less than a t the present, the p la in t i f f 
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should be given credit on any final award for that proportion 
of medical payments paid in excess of its proper share. 
POINT II 
CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY 
PAYMENTS DURING MEDICAL TREATMENT. 
As p a r t of t h e f i r s t temporary o r d e r of t h e defendant 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission, t h e p l a i n t i f f was o rde red t o pay 
temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y compensation dur ing p e r i o d s of 
i n p a t i e n t h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n and a f t e r r e l e a s e from the h o s p i t a l 
u n t i l defendant Or tega was r e l e a s e d fo r work a c t i v i t i e s . Af t e r 
p l a i n t i f f o b j e c t e d t o t h e i n i t i a l o r d e r , t he I n d u s t r i a l 
Commission amended i t s o r d e r b u t i n t h a t amended o r d e r , made no 
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y award. N o n e t h e l e s s , 
t h i s was c l e a r l y r a i s e d by p l a i n t i f f ' s motion for r ev iew, and 
more p a r t i c u l a r l y by i t s memorandum i n s u p p o r t of i t s motion 
fo r r ev iew. 
According t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p l a i n t i f f , de fendan t 
O r t e g a , p u r s u a n t t o t h e temporary o r d e r , began i n p a t i e n t t r e a t -
ment a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Utah H o s p i t a l and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , 
t r a n s f e r r e d t o o u t p a t i e n t t r e a t m e n t . According to r e p o r t s 
r e c e i v e d by p l a i n t i f f , i t appears t h a t she i s c o n t i n u i n g a t 
t h e p r e s e n t t ime under o u t p a t i e n t t r e a t m e n t and t h e r e i s no 
i n d i c a t i o n t h a t she has been r e l e a s e d t o work. On t h a t b a s i s , 
- 7 -
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it would appear from the temporary award, that plaintiff is 
required to pay a substantial temporary total disability 
award. 
The very nature of a temporary total disability award 
would be violated if such an award were upheld in this case. 
Since it was necessary that defendant Ortega had stabilized 
in order for the medical panel to assess a permanent partial 
disability, there can be no claim that at the time of her 
appearance before the medical panel she was entitled to 
temporary total disability in addition to a permanent partial 
disability award. The findings of fact in the temporary award 
itself indicate that defendant Ortega was temporarily totally 
disabled only until November 11, 19 73. 
To claim that defendant Ortega is now entitled to 
temporary total disability during the period of hospitaliza-
tion has to be on the basis that such hospitalization totally 
incapacitates her. Such is, however, not the case since she is 
being treated on an outpatient basis. Whether or not she has 
returned to work is not determined by her hospitalization needs, 
but rather by the degree of her permanent partial disability 
for which the medical panel has already made a finding. There 
is, therefore, no basis to assess the plaintiff with the costs 
of temporary total disability past November 11, 19 73. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO GIVE THE 
CLAIMANT A "BLANK CHECK" WITH REGARD TO HER TREATMENT. 
• 8-
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The temporary order of the defendant Commission does 
not specify the amount or extent of medical treatment which 
defendant Ortega should receive. Since the ailment is 
psychological and mental, it is conceivable that treatment 
could continue for an indefinite period of time. The defendant 
Commission in denying the motion for review, addressed itself 
to that issue and attempted to resolve the matter by indicating 
that a report by the administrative law judge and by the treat-
ing physician would be filed every 30 days* That does not, 
however, meet the objection that there is nothing to limit 
that treatment. The fact that the treating physician indicates 
what he has done, rather than what he will do in the future, 
and the fact that there are no brakes on the medical treatment, 
argues against any control. This Court has held in Carbon Fuel 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 156, 17 P.2d 215 (1932) 
that "the Commission is required to determine and fix the amount 
that shall be allowed an injured employee for medical treatment 
in advance of the rendering of such treatment." Cemph. added.) 
That this should be applied in this particular case is abundantly 
clear. The failure of the defendant Commission to meet that 
argument and to allow the "Blank Check" circumstances to exist 
is contrary to the law and the defendant Commission should be 
ordered to set a maximum amount that can be spent for medical 
treatment. 
-9_. 
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CONCLUSION 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t t he p l a i n t i f f i n t h i s case i s , a t 
most , r e s p o n s i b l e fo r only a p o r t i o n of de fendan t O r t e g a ' s 
permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y and t h a t t h e r ema inde r , o r a t 
l e a s t a good s h a r e of the r ema inde r , of t h o s e d i s a b i l i t i e s 
i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o p r e e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s . I t would be 
m a n i f e s t l y u n j u s t t o r e q u i r e t h i s p l a i n t i f f t o pay t h e f u l l 
amount of t he medica l expenses i n c u r r e d by de fendan t Or tega 
i n t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h o s e d i s a b i l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g the p r e -
e x i s t i n g d i s a b i l i t i e s . An appor t ionment shou ld be e s t a b l i s h e d
 { 
as t o t hose medica l e x p e n s e s . In a d d i t i o n , t h e defendant 
Commission shou ld be r e q u i r e d t o s e t a l e v e l on those expend-
i t u r e s which would n o t be un reasonab le under t he c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ^ 
F i n a l l y , du r ing t h e pendency of t h a t t r e a t m e n t t h e r e shou ld 
be no award fo r t o t a l temporary d i s a b i l i t y t o be a s s e s s e d 
a g a i n s t t he p l a i n t i f f . 4 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
DAVID A. WESTERBY 
KIRTON, McCONKIE, BOYER & BOYLE | 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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